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Introduction
Terrorism is the new face of violence with economic consequences. In the context of a paradoxical African setting, where countries in this region are in need of scarce economic resources to foster their development process, and also records almost the highest volume of global capital flight among developing countries, we take interest in understanding its linkage to terrorism. As a foundational definition; capital flight is the outflow of economic resources from respective countries (Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2014; Asongu, 2014) . It includes the outflows of short-term capital as a response to some factors that are peculiar with the respective country, and which may affect the economic value of such capital. Concisely, we ask two important questions: first, what magnitude of the capital flight from Africa can be explained by terrorists' activities? Second, how different is this magnitude when comparing terrorism initiated by the nationals of the respective countries (domestic terrorism) and those initiated across borders or by nationals of other countries (transnational terrorism)?
The answer to the first question has important implications to provide relevant empirical evidence on the cost of the rising terrorism in resource starved Africa. Most importantly, by providing relevant statistics on the magnitude of influence of terrorism on capital flight, the reality of the cost of terrorism can be better seen and may spur policy actions. Most countries in Africa are taking steps towards attracting and retaining capital, although part of the effort is to improve security and reduce the risk of investment within the country, however, a new generation of policy may be motivated if the economic value (in terms of capital flight) of a terrorist action is clearly known. The answer to the second question may suggest the relative impact of the two forms of terrorism, and afterwards the direction of policy efforts can be exploited towards tackling the one with higher economic impact. This is important considering that there is a rising campaign for development partners to increase aid flow to African countries (as well as other development countries) in order to augment the resources needed for counter-terrorism efforts (see Efobi et al, 2015; .
Empirical studies on the drivers of capital flight can be broadly categorised into two groups: the domestic and external determinants. The domestic drivers include those conditions that are prevalent within the country, which explains the reasons for capital flight. They include the structural features of the economy (in terms of the country being natural resource dependence or otherwise), macroeconomic environment (e.g. economic growth and inflation), risk and returns on investment (e.g. currency depreciation, financial instability, domestic tax rate), the governance structure of the country (such as corruption), and other forms of political factors. Focusing on the political factors, authors have identified the political environment of countries as having a significant influence on capital flight (Collier et al., 2004; Davies, 2008; Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2014) . Political instability such as war or civil unrest raises the insurance premium on investment, as well as the risk of loss or damages to assets. This causes investment capitals to be taken out of the country to countries where the risks of losing such investment are lower.
Terrorism involves the use of violence by individuals or groups against non-combatants in order to foster political or social objectives, and with the intimidation of a larger audience beyond the immediate victims . Unlike political instability, terrorists are involved in pressuring besieged government to concede to their demands by targeting civilians. Since the occurrences of terrorist actions are non-deterministic and may not be accurately predicted; hence, it raises the risk and cost of retaining capital in the venue country. In most cases, terrorist target central economic locations; with poor anti-terrorism efforts by the government, target countries will witness an increasing outflow of capital due to heightened uncertainties/capital security. On this note, it is important to also consider the distinct impact of the two main forms of terrorism (i.e. domestic and transnational). This is because there are rising incidences of African countries experiencing spill-over from terrorist activities in neighbouring countries. The Somali's Al-Shabaab activities in Kenya and some other East African countries; and the Nigeria's Boko Haram group perpetrating violence in neighbouring country Cameroon, Niger and Chad, are cases in point.
The contrasting effect of domestic and transnational terrorism have spurred research interest that is targeted at understanding its impact on capital movement. The earliest work to carry on this enquiry, especially for developing countries, are , and Bandyopadhyay et al, ( , 2015 . The authors studied the effect of both domestic and transnational terrorism on movement of foreign investments; they found similar negative impact but at different magnitudes. In the spirit of the debate, we provide the first empirical work on the linkage between terrorism (and its components) and capital flight using an isolated sample of 29 African countries. This sample is unique because of the controversial regimes of capital outflow it records. Interested readers can see Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye (2014) for a more detailed statistics of the trend of capital flight from Africa.
However, we make attempt to highlight some: as at the period 1970-90, capital flight from Africa was about 40 percent of the entire private wealth, which was about four times that of Latin America despite the higher private capital per worker of the later. Also, in 2010, unrecorded capital flight from Africa represents 39.5 percent of GDP, compared to 12 percent in the East and South Asia. The implication of this statistics are: first, the region faces a lot of capital constraint compared to other regions and a capital flight of this magnitude will imply that the available resources required for development will be further depleted. No wonder the huge resource gap recorded in the region (see Asiedu, 2006) . Second, as a result of this impoverishment, the damaging effect on human development structures will be further visible as funds needed for social services such as education and health care, among others, will be lacking (see Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011) . As a result of these, urgent attention is needed to understand other possible and emerging causes of capital flight as a further step towards resolving it. This paper is connected to the literature on the determinants of capital flight on one hand, and the economic consequences of the rising rate of global terrorism, on the other hand. The first strand of literature have not considered the dynamic influence of terrorism on capital flight.
The second strand of literature is becoming popular following the rising trend of terrorist attacks around the world. More importantly, attention is being drawn to understand the consequences as this will help to shape global policy on acts of terrorism. The contributors to this literature, and their focus has being: terrorism and its consequences on foreign investment Bandyopadhyay et al, , 2015 Asongu et al, 2015; Efobi et al, 2015) ; terrorism and the labour force (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2014a) ; terrorism and economic development (Piazza, 2006) ; terrorism and the productivity of certain sectors in the country (Berrebi and Klor, 2010; Berrebi and Ostwald, 2013) ; terrorism and fertility rate (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2014b) . This study is the first to relate these two strands of literature by using a sample from the African region for the period 1987 to 2008 as well as a variety of macroeconomic controls. We implement a robust panel analysis to understand the effects of terrorism on capital flight as well as observe the dynamic implications across the different origins of terrorism (i.e. transnational, domestic). We find that terrorism as a whole causes an increase in capital flight in Africa. However, when considering the disaggregated terrorism data, domestic terrorism significantly causes capital flight unlike transnational terrorism. Even unclear terrorism was also found to have a significant impact on capital flight. The effect of the different forms of terrorism on capital flight (considering varying quantiles) was further computed. This is such that the effect is considered at different intensities of terrorism. The result suggest that at 75 percent quantile, both domestic and transnational significantly explains the extent of capital flight from African countries. As for the unclear terrorism and total terrorism, the impact on capital flight was significant across the levels of percentiles apart from 25 and 90 percent quantiles (unclear terrorism), and 10 percent quantile for total terrorism.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows: the second section lays out the empirical model, describes the variables and discuss the data. The econometric methodology was introduced and elaborated on in the third section, while the estimation results are presented and discussed in the fourth section. The fifth section concludes the paper.
Literature Review
In this section, we present theoretical reasoning showing how the rising wave of terrorism will further impact on the incidences of capital flights. The theoretical explanations in this section does not suggest that anti-terrorism measures are sufficient or relevant for the reduction of the rising capital flight in Africa, as this provides insight to further studies that can be taken up in the future.
The linkage between terrorism and capital flight is understood from the theoretical framework that explains how violence affects the movement of capital from a country.
Collier (1999) presents a clear theoretical framework using civil war as a measure of violence, and its economic impact on respective countries. One of the main feature of Collier's theory is that the capital stock of countries tend to reduce as a result of incidences of civil war. Conflict increases the rate of uncertainty with respect to the future returns on assets held within the country. As a result of this, domestic investors relocate their capital abroad. This is termed portfolio substitutions. Some studies that support this proposition include Le and Zak (2001), Ndikumana and Boyce (2002) , and Davies (2010) .
To properly situate this theoretical framework, it is important to discuss how terrorism differ from other forms of violence like war, domestic conflicts and instabilities. Terrorism and other forms of violence are similar in terms of their resultant effects. Which are mostly loss of life and property. However, a clear distinction between them can be seen in their targets.
For terrorism, the targets are often non-combatant individuals (see Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2014) , who may be unaware of the ideologies or the objectives of the terrorists.
Terrorists aim at non-combatants in order to raise their anxiety levels so that they pressure their government to grant the terrorist's demands (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2010) . This explains the reasons for a unified global effort targeted against terrorist activities: its effect adversely impacts innocent non-combatants. On the other-hand, the targets of other forms of violence are mostly combatants or government forces, and to a large extent, the violence is spurred by one party being disgruntled or having a deep feeling of being cheated (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Sharma, 2006; Sandlers and Emders, 2008; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2011 ).
Terrorism can be categorised into two main groups: domestic and transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is home grown and home directed and the perpetrators, victims, and audience are from the venue country. This is unlike transnational terrorism with perpetrators, supporters, victims, and audience involving two or more countries (Bandyopahyay, Sandler and Younas, 2011) . There are varying impact of these two forms of terrorism on the domestic capital stocks of countries. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) examines this effect on the income per capita of African countries for the period 1970-2007. For the entire sample, they found a transnational terrorism as having a significant impact on income per capita: the absence of a domestic terrorism impact was also observed. One identified reason for the differences in the impact of the two forms of terrorism is that transnational terrorism targets foreign citizens, foreign businesses (including personnel and assets), as well as international institutions. This will have a significant effect on capital retention in the country (Sandler and Enders, 2008) . (2014) is another closely related study, but with emphasis on a broader sample of 72 developing countries, and focusing on counterterrorism effect of foreign aid. The authors found the both types of terrorism having a depressing effect on foreign investment. Their intuition is: terrorist activities tend to increase the premium on retaining investment in the venue country, and heightens the risk capital and output losses, and other overhead cost like security. As a result of this, investment capital tend to be repatriated from countries that are prone to terrorist activities. As a comment on the issue of violence and capital repatriation, Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye (2014) supports this finding but with a focus on other violent activities apart from terrorism.
Banyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas
What interest us here is how we can apply the portfolio substitutions theory of collier (1999) to explain the relationship being modelled in this study. We expect a positive relationship between terrorism and capital flight, however when considering the components of terrorism (i.e. domestic and transnational terrorism), we will rely on some theoretical explanations. For instance, transnational terrorism targets foreign citizens, foreign businesses and international institutions that are operational within the country, therefore it is expected that its impact will stimulate more capital repatriation from the affected country compared to domestic terrorism.
The studies (i.e. Sandler and Enders, 2008; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011) that reached this conclusion was focusing on a different form of capital -foreign investment -unlike the interest of this study. The mechanism is that: since terrorism affect the economic value of capital, capital owners will tend to substitute the location of their capital from the respective country to another location abroad (see Collier, 1999) . We are cautious to say that this theoretical explanation applies for only transnational terrorism, especially since we are considering capital flight and not foreign investment, like other studies have focused on.
Better clarity will be reached from our empirical analysis.
Data and Methodology

Data
The terrorism data are from Efobi et al. (2015) and . The capital flight data is from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a) The control variables include: corruption-control, fuel exports, trade openness and exchange rate. These have been substantially documented in the African capital flight literature (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998 , 2003 , 2008 Asongu, 2013a Asongu, , 2014a Asongu, , 2015 Weeks, 2012) . First, capital flight has been documented to increase with poor institutional quality, notably: the absence of corruption-control (Weeks, 2012) . The expected sign of this governance indicator depends on whether the distribution of corruption-control is positively or negatively skewed. This is consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) who have based their study on bad governance because the governance indicators employed were negatively skewed for the most part. Second, according to Ndikumana (2003, 2012b) , fuel-exporting countries are generally associated with higher levels of capital flight.
Third, in accordance with Asongu (2013a) , trade globalization is a natural determinant of capital flight, especially with practices like transfer pricing (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008 Asongu, 2015) . Fourth, very high deterioration of exchange rate increases capital flight (Asongu, 2014; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003) because it betrays a negative economic outlook. Accordingly, investors prefer investment strategies that are less economically ambiguous (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab) . The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1 below. The summary statistics of the variables is presented in Table 2 . Some of the indicators are presented in logarithms to enable comparisons in terms of means. We also notice that there is a substantial degree variation in the variables, implying that we can be confident that significant estimated relationships would emerge. Table 3 below presents the summary statistics of the variables. Its purpose is to mitigate potential issues of multicollinearity. We observe that such issues are apparent among terrorism variables which display relatively higher degrees of substitution. We address these issues by using distinct specifications for each terrorism variable. 
Methodology
3.2.1Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)
In accordance with recent terrorism and capital flight (Asongu, 2014a) literature, we adopt a two-step GMM with forward orthogonal deviations instead of differencing as an empirical strategy. This technique is an extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) by Roodman (2009ab) and has the advantage of accounting for cross-sectional dependence and restricting the proliferation of instruments (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008) .
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation procedure.
Where:
CF , is capital flight in country i at period t ; is a constant;  represents tau ; T , entails terrorism dynamics (domestic, transitional, unclear and total) ; W is the vector of control variables (corruption-control, trade openness, exchange rate and fuel exports), i  is the country-specific effect, t  is the time-specific constant and t i,  the error term. In the specification, we prefer the two-step to the one-step procedure because it is heteroscedasticity-consistent.
Quantile Regressions
Consistent with the literature on conditional effects , 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation is analogous to Table 3 . Table 4 and Table 5 present results corresponding to GMM and QR estimations. We engage them chronologically. Table 4 is presented in four main sets of specifications, notably for: We consider the former (1% and 5% levels) in establishing the following findings. First, domestic, unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase capital flight, with the magnitude relatively higher from unclear terrorism. Second, most of the significant control variables have the expected signs, notably: (i) corruption-control that is negatively skewed increases capital flight; (ii) trade globalisation is positive related with capital flight and (iii) the sign of exchange rate is indeterminate while that of 'fuel exports' is unexpected. Fortunately, the signs of fuel exports are consistently positive in the QR findings. Instruments  21  25  29  21  25  29  21  25  29  21  25  29  Countries  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  Observations  118  118  118  118  118  118  118  118  118  118  118  118 *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments' Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics.
Empirical results
Presentation of results
2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR (1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. Table 5 on QR is presented in two main panels, notably Panel A on domestic and transnational terrorisms and Panel B on unclear and total terrorisms. We notice that the OLS findings are consistently different from the QR estimations, which justifies the choice of the estimation technique. It is interesting to note that the findings of Table 4 are based on mean effects of the dependent variable while those of Table 5 are based on conditional quantiles of the dependent variables. The following can be established for Table 5 with 1% and 5% significance levels. First, contrary to Table 4 , the effect of transnational terrorism is now significant in the top quantiles (0.75 th and 0.90 th ) of the capital flight distribution. Second, domestic terrorism is also significant in the top quantiles. Third, unclear terrorism is significant in the 0.10 th and 0.75 th quantiles. Fourth, the effect of total terrorism is also significant in top quantiles. Fifth, the significant control variable (or 'fuel exports') has the expected sign. 
Further discussion and policy implications
We have broadly established that terrorism negatively affects capital flight. This finding is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings enunciated in the motivation of this line of inquiry. Whereas the effect from transnational terrorism is not significant in GMM specifications, we have found it to be significant in top quantiles of the QR specifications. 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2011 It is also important to devote space the discussing the policy implications relating to capital flight convergence. We notice evidence of catch-up in regressions related to domestic, unclear and total terrorisms. Consistent with the capital flight catch-up literature (Asongu, 2014a) , the criterion for evidence of conditional catch-up is when the absolute value of the lagged capital flight variable is between zero and one. Asongu (2014a, p.111) . It is interesting to note that the comparison is most feasible for the: (i) full sample and (ii) 3 year non-overlapping interval; modelling from the corresponding study.
The harmonization of common policies against capital flight can be enhanced by reducing terrorism-related cross-country differences that are inhibiting the convergence process. Some documented mechanisms to fighting terrorism have included, inter alia: education (Brockhoff et al., 2014) , especially in the promotion of bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008) ; transparency (internal and external) (Bell et al., 2014) ; press freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013) ; military mechanisms (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010) ; the assessment of behaviours towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007) and respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010).
Conclusion and future directions
Building on previous literature, we set-out to tackle two main issues notably: (i) the effect of terrorism on capital flight and (ii) how this effect varies from one terrorism dynamic to another. We have investigated the effects of terrorism on capital flight in a panel 29 African countries for which data is available for the period 1987-2008. The terrorism dynamics entail domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations and Quantile regressions (QR). The latter methodology is based on the intuition that blanket policies may 2 We are dividing the lagged estimated value by 3 because we have used three-year non-overlapping intervals.
not be effective unless they are contingent on initial capital flight levels and tailored differently across high-and low-'capital flight' countries. The following findings have been established. First, for GMM, domestic, unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase capital flight, with the magnitude relatively higher from unclear terrorism. Second, for QR:
(i) the effect of transnational terrorism is now positively significant in the top quantiles (0.75 th and 0.90 th ) of the capital flight distribution, (ii) domestic and total terrorisms are also significant in the top quantiles and (iii) unclear terrorism is significant in the 0.10 th and 0.75 th quantiles. Policy implications have been discussed. Further research inquiries devoted to extending the line of inquiry can focus on country-specific studies.
